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1 Introduction 
 
Numerous studies have been made of regional differences in income and level of 
development in Italy, and these studies basically differ in the responses they give to the question of 
whether the said differences were already of a substantial nature prior to Unification, or whether in 
fact they have widened since then.  
The latest estimates regarding production and multifactor productivity in agriculture, 
manufacturing industry and the service sector, would seem to support the latter of the two theses1, 
whereas the majority of previous studies tended towards the former2. 
The present essay is going to examine this problem from a completely different point of view, 
by focusing on the local administrative system adopted after Italian Unification, in order to 
ascertain the existence of a different approach to public intervention at the local level, and thus to 
the existence of disparities in local public spending. 
At the time of Unification, one of the main problems that the new centralised state was faced 
with was that of establishing the relationship between different levels of government, in a context 
characterised by very different traditions: the two ends of the “spectrum” in question were 
represented by the Lombardy region’s local municipalities, which performed a variety of functions 
and enjoyed a considerable degree of  autonomy, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the 
administration of which was highly centralised3. 
Before going on to analyse the local administrative system adopted, we need to introduce a 
number of definitions. From the legal point of view, a system4 may be defined as federal if there is a 
division of powers between the centre, federal government and the peripheral units, and if 
constitutional safeguards are provided - by the Supreme Court, a second Chamber or popular 
                                                 
1
  Felice 2005 & 2007; Fenoaltea 2003; Daniele and Malanima 2007. 
2
  Zamagni 1987; Giuntini 1999; Esposto 1997. 
3
  Volpe 1962. 
4
  Brosio 1994. 
referendum – for the powers exercised by the aforesaid peripheral units. If such safeguards are not 
present, then the system may be defined as regional. However, economists tend to use the term 
“fiscal federalism” in the broad sense, as Wallace O. Oates points out: “The term federalism for the 
economist is not to be understood in a narrow constitutional sense. In economic terms, all 
governmental systems are more or less federal; even in a formally unitary system, for example, 
there is typically a considerable extent of de facto fiscal discretion at decentralized levels”5.  This 
observation enables us to offer the last definition we promised, namely that of fiscal independence: 
this term refers to the existence of degrees of freedom, enjoyed by local government, in the choice 
of tax base or (at least) in the fixing of tax rates. In fact, Oates’ definition suggests that political 
federalism is not necessary in order to have fiscal federalism (or fiscal independence). 
This rather lengthy foreword serves two principal purposes: firstly, to present one of the 
fundamental decisions taken at the time of Italian Unification; and secondly, to try and understand 
what many have considered a contradictory feature of the political class of that time, which despite 
its liberal character decided to construct a centralised state system in Italy. The intentions of this 
political class were clearly summarised by Cavour, when he stated that “administrative 
centralisation is one of the most disastrous institutions of the modern day …”, and on another 
occasion that “we are not federalists, but neither are we in favour of a centralised state..”6. The latter 
claim became a leitmotif, which emerged once again in the report by Rattazzi on the new municipal 
and provincial system, published in 18597. In other words, while plans for a federal system, and 
then a regional one, were rejected, this did not mean that the ideas of administrative decentralisation 
and municipal/regional fiscal autonomy were rejected outright. Nor is it true to say that the fiscal 
principle most dear to the liberalists of that time was rejected, that is, the idea that each municipality 
should only finance its own public works, or those works which it enjoyed to some degree. This 
was the principle underlying the decentralisation of tax revenue, which was already a feature of the 
majority of pre-Unification states, and upon which the local system was based following 
Unification and up until the end of the 19th century (at the very least). 
Despite the decentralisation of fiscal revenue, historians (in particular those specialised in the 
field of political administration) have repeatedly highlighted the centralising tendencies of local and 
provincial legislation in the Kingdom of Italy8, particularly with regard to the control mechanisms 
in place at that time. On the other hand, economic historians, more interested in local public 
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  Oates 1991. 
6
  Petracchi 1962. 
7
  “Thus the more the law hinders any federal tendency, the more it guarantees local freedom”. Report on the 
new municipal and provincial system, presented to His Highness by the Minister for the Interior on the 23rd October 
1859, and published in volume 3 of Petracchi 1962.  
8
  Numerous observers have lent  their support to the centralisation hypothesis, including: C. Pavone 1964; 
Ruffilli 1981; Zanni-Rosiello 1976. 
spending mechanisms, have always offered a very different interpretation of things. Back in 1962, 
G. Volpe wrote the following: “an examination of the laws that regulated local authorities in Italy’s 
former states, and a comparison of the functions performed by such local authorities before and 
after Unification, as shown by the respective financial statements, enable us to reduce the polemical 
reference to ancient autonomies which appear substantially scaled down by the superimposition of 
Napoleonic laws and by the Restoration”9. In 1981 a second essay by P. Frascani underlined the 
important role that municipalities play in certain key sectors of public spending, such as education, 
healthcare and the road network10, in terms both of their powers and their levels of expenditure. 
Finally, certain economists such as F. Cavazzuti (1967) and Brosio and Marchesi (1987), have used 
the ratio of local revenue to total revenue to suggest that following Unification, the Italian state was 
centralised to a far lesser degree than traditional theory would have us believe11. 
The following pages are designed to offer an analysis of the actual working of the post-
Unification administrative system in Italy, in terms both of the powers attributed to Italy’s 
municipalities and provinces, and of the degree of autonomy they had in deciding on funding 
methods. This analysis aims to ascertain whether the chosen strategy could have been maintained in 
a state characterised by strong regional differences, and to establish the kind of impact such a 
strategy had on the regional differences themselves.  
 
 
2. Local public expenditure and its funding prior to Unification 
 
From the middle of the 19th century onwards, the need to separate local government powers 
from those of central government became increasingly evident, as shown by the approval of special 
laws to this effect: in Lombardy-Veneto in 1832, in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1849, in the 
Papal States in 1850, in the Kingdom of Savoy in 1859 (the Rattazzi Law, which was to be applied 
to the entire Italian peninsula after Unification). In the Duchy of Parma, on the other hand, the 
separation of powers was established by two decrees, issued in 1819 and 1831. In general, local 
municipalities were entrusted with certain public works (such as waterworks, roads and cemeteries), 
and with the management of public healthcare and primary-school education, albeit in accordance 
with differing degrees of power and autonomy. At the time of Unification, there was only one state 
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  Volpe 1962. 
10
  Frascani 1981; Mozzarelli 1992 and Battilani 1997, all point to the considerable efforts made by local 
administrations to create more modern infrastructures, accompanied by a substantial increase in local public spending, 
between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Another series of studies underline the fact 
that pro-capita municipal expenditure in Italy’s southern regions was lower: Bonomi 1903; Tenerelli 1913; Repaci 
1936.  
11
  Cavazzuti 1967; Brosio and Marchese 1986. 
that did not have any specific law establishing local government powers, and that was the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies12. 
In order to get a clearer idea of the role of the municipalities in the pre-Unification states, we 
can compare their balance sheets13, using the year 1858 as a benchmark where possible, or 1860 
otherwise. We are going to analyse the entity of local government spending and the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation in 1858 (Table 1), and the methods of funding employed in 1860 (Tables 2 and 3). 
The aforesaid figures show that municipal spending was highest in Lombardy-Veneto, 
followed by the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Kingdom of Savoy (excluding Sardinia), but was 
very low in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (with the exception of those municipalities situated on 
the island of Sicily itself), in the Papal States and in the Emilian Duchies (Table 1). Furthermore, 
while the Kingdom of Savoy, the Papal States and Lombardy-Veneto were characterised by a rather 
high level of central state spending, in the Two Sicilies this form of expenditure was once again 
very limited. If we sum central state spending and local municipal spending, what we get is a 
considerable gap between one state and another, and in particular between Lombardy-Veneto (35.7 
lire overhaed) and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (22, 7 lire overhead).  
We are going to use the ratio of municipal revenue to total revenue (that is municipal plus 
central state) as our index of fiscal decentralisation14(Table 1). This index shows that the two most 
decentralised states were Lombardy-Veneto and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, while the least 
decentralised (most centralised) states were the Kingdom of Savoy, the Papal States and the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
The weight of the various taxes levied also varied considerably. As a rule, municipal tax 
revenue came from two main different sources: “indirect taxes” such as municipal custom duties 
and “direct taxes” such as over-taxes on land or income central state taxes. In order to analyse this 
aspect of the question, we are going to take the year 1860 as our benchmark, since we do not have 
any disaggregated figures for 185815.  
The comparison of the various states’ finances shows that the land over-tax, which were 
based upon cadastral records, were of prime importance everywhere except in the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies. Furthermore, several states levied various forms of municipal tax some way 
                                                 
12
  Scialoja 1857, pp. 114-116. 
13
  Correnti and Maestri 1857-58. 
14
  We have excluded the Duchy of Parma from our comparison, since municipal revenue derived from central 
state transfers. Moreover, we should point out that we are not taking district and provincial revenue into consideration, 
and thus the level of decentralisation is underestimated by our indicator (except in the case of the Grand Duchy of 
Tuscany).    
15
  Despite the fact that the process of unification of Italy was already at an advanced stage in 1860, no 
municipality had changed its system of surcharges, while as far as customs duty was concerned, the only changes were 
those made by the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, where the two states’ municipalities 
were assigned those shares of such revenue that would normally have gone into the coffers of the states themselves. 
connected to income: in the Papal States, this took the form of a livestock tax and a focatico, a sort 
of family tax that could remind the English hearth tax; in the Kingdom of Savoy, a license tax was 
levied; in Lombardy, there was a crafts and trades tax; and in the Duchies of Parma and Modena, 
there was a tax on industry and trade. Once again, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies constituted the 
exception to the rule, as there were no such taxes16. 
Indirect taxation was based upon municipal excise duties on consumer goods and certain 
manufacturing taxes (Table 2). The said duties were split between central government and the 
municipalities, on a percentage basis which varied from one state to another, and which was not 
modified during the first few years of the newly-unified Italian state (except in the Grand Duchy of 
Tuscany and the Two Sicilies, where all such tax revenue was assigned to the local 
municipalities17). In the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, in the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (as a 
result of a decree issued in March 1860 by the provisional governments), and in certain regions of 
the Papal States (such as Umbria), the only duty levied was the municipal one; in the Duchy of 
Parma and in other provinces of the Papal States (the Marches), a substantial share of this tax 
revenue was assigned to the municipalities; in the Kingdom of Savoy, customs duty revenue was 
shared equally by the central state and the municipalities; while in Lombardy, the Duchy of Modena 
and other provinces of the Papal States (Romagna), nearly all customs duty went to the central state.  
With the help of Table 3, we can now compare the municipal tax policy adopted by the 
various states prior to Unification. The composition of municipal tax revenue varied enormously 
from one state to another. For example, in the provinces of Lombardy and in the Emilian Duchies, 
two-thirds of such revenue was accounted for by land over-tax, whereas this figure was about 50% 
in the Kingdom of Savoy; in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, land over-tax constituted more than 60% 
of all municipal revenue, even after the assignment of all municipal excise duties on consumer 
goods to the municipalities themselves; in the Papal States there were considerable differences 
between one province and another, given that over-taxes were of primary importance in Romagna, 
whereas duties were more important in the Marche and in Umbria; finally, in the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies, the only tax revenue was that yielded by excise duties. 
Summing up then, the importance of the municipalities, the level of fiscal decentralisation, 
and tax policy in general, varied considerably from one former state to another, although they also 
had certain features in common as well. There was only one state that was completely different 
from the others, and that was the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  
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  In Sicily there was only a very small provincial over-tax on loaned capital. 
17
  G. Parravicini 1858; Volpi 1952. 
3. Local public expenditure and its funding after Unification 
 
Thus at the time of Unification, Italy’s local arrangements were not part of a particularly 
decentralised system. The extension of the Rattazzi decree was designed to achieve both political 
unity (by mediating between Lombardy and Piedmont), and a certain degree of administrative 
decentralisation, as Rattazzi himself highlighted when submitting his decree to Parliament18. In 
general, as far as electoral procedures went, the Piedmont model was preserved (albeit with the 
extension of the electoral base), whereas in terms of power, the Lombard model was adopted; with 
regard to funding of local expenditure, on the other hand, the chosen model was a mix of the 
previous Piedmontese and Lombard systems (Piedmontese as far as duties were concerned, but 
Lombard with regard to the land over-tax)19. The second important legislative measure taken was 
the 1865 law on municipal and provincial administrations, whereby municipal and provincial tax 
revenues were standardised20 (this law had been preceded by Law no. 1827 governing excise duty 
on consumer goods, approved on the 3rd July 1864). 
The effects of these measures can be partly seen in Table 4, which compares an index of tax 
revenue decentralisation (the ratio of the Italian state’s average revenue to that of the municipalities 
within the various regions) calculated for 1863 and 1868, with the one for the year 1858. This 
comparison reveals that legislation after Unification aimed at providing the country’s municipalities 
with increased powers, as shown by the widespread increase in fiscal decentralisation: those regions 
that were previously characterised  by low levels of fiscal decentralisation, subsequently witnessed 
a considerable growth in their fiscal status (especially the Neapolitan provinces), unlike those 
regions which had previously boasted high levels of decentralisation, such as Lombardy and Emilia. 
These changes were particularly marked in the case of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, where 
local councillors were elected for the first time, and municipalities were bestowed a series of 
specific functions. For example, in the field of education measures were taken to organise a network 
of primary schools throughout the former state, rather than simply rely on the payment of the odd 
school teacher here and there, as had been the case up until then. Such data show why it was that in 
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, given its previous lower levies (compared to the rest of the 
country), there was such an outcry at what was now perceived as excessive taxation.  
                                                 
18
  That year, Rattazzi had presented a first bill regarding municipal and provincial administration, which would 
have given the country’s municipalities a greater role, and would have reduced the supervisory role of the central state; 
this bill, however, was opposed by the Subalpine Government.  
19
  Rattazzi’s interest in the situation in Lombardy was confirmed by the heed he paid to the Giuliani 
Commission, some of the findings and proposals of which were directly transposed to the Rattazzi Law (Petracchi 
1962).   
20
  During the first few years following Unification, Italy’s municipalities were left the power to levy their 
previous taxes, despite implementation of the Rattazzi Law.   
However, the process of standardisation proved to be slower than it ought to have been if 
fiscal revenue was to be established at a uniform level in the various regions. In fact, 36 years 
proved too short a period of time for the municipalities in the more backward areas of Italy to be 
able to dispose of the same resources as those municipalities situated in the country’s wealthier 
areas. Figures 1 and 2, together with tables 5 and 6, show that in 1863, per capita tax revenue in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was one half that of the Papal States, the Kingdom of Savoy and 
Tuscany, and only just over one-third of that of Lombardy. In order to bring it up closer to the 
national average, those areas that once belonged to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies increased tax 
revenue by 124% between 1863 and 1899. Despite the considerable efforts made, tax revenue in the 
former Kingdom never reached the level of that in the other former states. Regions such as the 
Abruzzo, Molise, Calabria and Campania itself (if the city of Naples is excluded), boasted a 
negative record in terms of fiscal revenue, which they continued to hold every year thereafter.  
Two things should be pointed out here: one is the difference in the role played by 
municipalities in the diverse areas belonging to the pre-Unification states; the other is the 
persistence of this homogeneity over the course of forty years subsequent to Unification. These 
results are hardly surprising, especially given that the essence of fiscal decentralisation is to allow 
local communities to choose its taxes and public goods: this “good” form of non-homogeneity 
derives from local communities’ diverse propensities towards public intervention. However, the 
differences in per-capita revenue between one Italian region and another during the first fifty years 
of unification, also derives from their diverse tax capabilities and, at the end of the day, from the 
differing levels of income: this form of non-homogeneity could be defined as “bad”, since it 
describes a situation in which the lower level of public involvement is not accompanied by a 
correspondingly higher level of private investment, but rather by a lower level of overall aggregate 
demand. If we consider the poorer availability of public goods in Italy’s southern regions, and the 
consequent need to support higher levels of expenditure in order to bridge the gap between these 
southern regions and the country’s richer regions, then the limitations of an administrative system 
based upon the pure decentralisation of tax revenue are clear for all to see.  
 
 
4. Local governments’ fiscal policy   
 
As we have already said in section 2, there were marked differences in the municipal fiscal 
policies of Italy’s various former states. There was a particularly clear difference in the way that 
land over-tax were utilised, and once again the greatest gap was between the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies and the other states. In fact, while over-tax constituted around 40% of ordinary municipal 
revenue throughout the nation, only indirect taxes were levied by local government in the Two 
Sicilies21.  
The 1865 Law encouraged a greater degree of uniformity of local municipalities’ fiscal 
policy. In general, the importance of the over-tax increased considerably in the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies (by 1899 it had risen to 24% of all fiscal revenue), whereas its share of total tax 
revenue tended to fall in the other states (in the Kingdom of Savoy it fell from 41% in 1865 to 27% 
in 1899); however, this still failed to bridge the existing gap between the former states. 
The lesser degree to which land over-tax were resorted to in the southern Italian regions was, 
of course, due in part to the technical nature of such taxes: given that they were proportional to 
presumed income (based on cadastral records), they yielded far less in the poorer parts of the 
country. Nevertheless, a more detailed analysis would suggest a second hypothesis, and one that is 
linked to the fiscal policies of those administering the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In fact, from 
1866 onwards a whole series of laws and decrees were passed imposing specific restrictions on the 
country’s municipal administrations with regard to their additional rates22; these restrictions were 
necessary in order to distribute the fiscal burden among various types of tax - so that all citizens had 
to bear that burden in one way or another – and in order to protect landowners from the excessive 
use of land over-tax by local councils. However, not all municipalities observed the said restrictions 
all the time (see Table 9), and an interesting difference between North and South emerged on this 
point, since the legal limits were often exceeded in central and northern regions (in 1899, this was 
the case in 80% - 90% of all municipalities), whereas this was only sporadically the case in the 
former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (where no more than 50% of all municipalities failed to 
observe the said restrictions). 
How should such data be interpreted? Given the extreme difficulty that the municipalities had 
in carrying out all those functions envisaged by law, during the 1880s and ‘90s, the exceeding of the 
legal limit for land over-tax represented a genuine political choice, namely that of using all margins 
for manoeuvre granted by fiscal decentralisation – and indeed of exceeding the said margins – in 
order to satisfy the increased demand for public goods. That this constituted a genuine political 
decision is partly confirmed by the fact that those municipalities who went beyond the aforesaid 
legal limits were more numerous in those very areas where municipal revenue was highest. On this 
                                                 
21
  In practice, a provincial surcharge was levied in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (the “grana addizionali” – 
additional duties or surcharges), but this item was entered in the accounts of the central state,  since the revenue from 
this surcharge was made available to the Minister of Public Works. Scialoja 1857.  
22
  The following are the laws in question: no. 3022 of the 28th June 1866 and no. 3023 of the 26th July 1868; no. 
5784 of the 11th August 1870; no. 1961 of the 14th June 1874; no. 3682 of the 1st March 1886; no. 340 of the 23rd July 
1894.   
point, it is interesting to note the difference between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the 
Veneto. While pro-capita tax revenue from land taxes attributed to the central state was almost 
identical in both states (both in 1884 and 1899), there was an enormous difference between the two 
in terms of revenue from municipal over-taxes: the municipalities situated in the Veneto collected 
exactly twice as much tax revenue as those situated in the South. 
As far as excise duties were concerned, on the other hand, things were very different; in fact, 
there was no significant difference between the southern provinces and the other areas of Italy (see 
Table 8 and Figs. 5A and 5B). In 1868, the first year for which figures for municipal excise duties  
are available, the per-capita duty collected in the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (even 
excluding the province of Naples) was greater than that collected in Lombardy, in the Emilian 
Duchies, and in the former Papal States, but was lower than the pro-capita revenue recorded in the 
former Kingdom of Savoy and in Tuscany. A similar picture emerges from an examination of the 
figures for 1895. 
A comparison of the tariffs applied to the main products offers further food for thought. We 
have figures for 1895 regarding the excise tariffs applied by each municipality. If we limit our 
analysis to 14 large municipalities (those with over 50,000 inhabitants) and 49 medium-sized 
municipalities (those with a population of between 20,000 and 50,000)23, and we limit the sample to 
be examined to 25 products, then no significant differences emerge between one area and another. 
Of course there were certain towns and cities which applied higher tariffs, but these towns were 
fairly evenly distributed among the various geographical areas of the country (see Figs. 5A and 5B). 
To sum up then, the municipal and provincial system adopted after Unification, increased the 
level of fiscal decentralisation of Italy’s municipalities compared with the previous period in history 
(prior to Unification), perhaps with the sole exception of Lombardy, and produced (or rather, 
preserved) substantial differences in the level of per-capita municipal revenue. Those municipalities 
that had previously belonged to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, operated for the entire 40-year 
period in question with much lower revenue levels than the rest of the country as a result of the 
smaller amount of income available. This difference may be partly ascribed to the tax system that 
had been adopted, and partly to the preservation of older habits. More specifically, the land over-tax 
was used to a lesser degree in the South of Italy than in other parts of the country (the centre and 
north)24, and municipalities did not make any attempt to play a more important role in fiscal 
matters.  
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  The excise duties levied by these municipalities represented 58% of all such income within the Kingdom. 
24
  Nitti and Gini ???? 
5 Financial equalisation mechanisms        
 
The analysis that has been carried out up to this point enables us to confirm what Frascani25 
deduced some time ago with regard to the decentralisation of tax revenue in Italy’s administrative 
system following Unification. In addition to this conclusion, we would like to add two further 
considerations, both of an economic nature. The main limitation to pure federal systems is generally 
acknowledged to be that of providing inadequate financial means to poorer areas. This limitation 
also characterises those decentralised systems that fail to implement automatic equalisation 
mechanisms. In the Italian case, such mechanisms did not exist at all. In fact, of we consider the 
government subsidies granted to Municipalities and Provinces, we can but conclude that that not 
only were they too small to bridge the massive gaps present in Italy, but also their distribution was 
not designed for the purpose of financial equalisation. As Table 11 shows, the subsidies26 granted to 
local municipalities and provinces never exceeded 2 or 3% of total municipal or provincial revenue, 
right up until the end of the century.  
An analysis of the geographical distribution of these subsidies is even more revealing. In fact, 
if they had been designed to equalise wealth, those municipalities with the lowest pro-capita 
revenue (or with the lowest levels of expenditure on public works or education) would have 
collected greater pro-capita subsidies than they actually did. The regressions27 we performed for the 
year 1873 display positive coefficients for the main items of pro-capita municipal revenue. In other 
words, the areas that enjoyed the highest revenue were granted the highest government subsidies. 
Thus for this period at least, the distribution of subsidies led to the accentuation of geographical 
differences. Unlike in the cases of the other years for which the regression was performed, the 
results for 1873 were good, with an R2 of 40%.  In fact, the regression failed for 1884 and 1899; in 
other words, those variable factors we took into consideration are not able to explain the 
geographical distribution of the subsidies, which were evidently granted on the basis of criteria 
other than the spending and tax capacities of the various geographical areas in question. We can 
only conclude, therefore, that the few subsidies granted to municipalities were not designed for 
equalising purposes, and that the municipalities’ varying tax capacities were not balanced out by 
means of this instrument. 
                                                 
25
  Frascani 1981. 
26
  These subsidies were entered in the accounts of local administrations under the heading of extraordinary 
revenue. They were special subsidies in that they were granted for the purpose of funding public works or schooling.  
27
  In practice we regressed pro-capita government subsidies to local municipalities on pro-capita municipal 
spending on public works and education, and on pro-capita revenue. The figures we used were of a provincial nature, 
and thus we could avail ourselves of a total of 69 observations.  
Before we reach any final conclusion regarding the equalisation system (or lack thereof), we 
need to consider one further item, namely subsidized credit. Table 13 presents two indicators: the 
first indicator is the percentage of residual debt owed to the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti  (the Deposits 
and Loans Fund – a public body that issues state funds to local authorities in Italy) against total 
municipal debts; the second indicator is the pro-capita debt due to the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. 
These two  indicators have been taken into consideration with the aim of evaluating the regional 
distribution of this form of state funding. In fact, given that the interest rates applied by the Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti  are 2 or 3 percentage points lower than the market rates, the pro-capita debt due 
to this body may provide us with an approximate idea of the entity of the granted subsidy. 
Table 13 shows that in 1877 this body still had a limited presence, and the regions that 
benefited most from its services were Sardinia, Sicily and the Marche. This distribution would seem 
to suggest some form of equalising mechanism, given that the two islands at least were 
characterised by below-average levels of municipal revenue. However, it should be said that of the 
southern regions as a whole, Sardinia and Sicily were not the ones with the lowest levels of revenue 
(this negative “honour” went to Calabria and the Abruzzi, which both had very limited debts with 
the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti). During the 1880s and ‘90s, the importance of this body in relation to 
municipal debt as a whole increased enormously, to the point where by 1900 it covered more than 
half of all municipal debt. While it is clear that the central and southern regions frequently resorted 
to this source of funding, its equalising design is not so clear given that the major recipients of 
funds included municipalities situated in the regions of Liguria and Tuscany (which were certainly 
not among those areas with the lowest municipal revenue), whereas Calabria and Basilicata 
remained somewhat at the margins of this funding process.  
We can thus conclude that the subsidies granted to municipalities and provinces had no real 
equalising effects, and were probably not designed for such purposes.  A little more was achieved 
through the issue of subsidised credit, although once again this was also utilised by the wealthier 
areas of Italy.  
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The first conclusion we would like to offer is that the 1865 Law did not reduce the 
previously-existing level of fiscal decentralisation: it failed to do so in the Grand Duchy of 
Tuscany, where the Restoration had established very different constraints upon local municipalities’ 
freedom; it also failed to do so in Lombardy-Veneto, which in fact saw part of its own 
administrative traditions being extended to the rest of Italy28. Those regions that were radically 
affected by the provisions of the 1865 Law were mainly those belonging to the former Kingdom of 
the Two Sicilies, which were subjected to a degree of decentralisation which they were not used to. 
Having said this, we ought to remember some of the reasons that led the governing class of 
the newly-unified Italian state to adopt a centralised system of controls and a decentralised tax 
system. Firstly, there was the awareness that the Italian electoral system, together with the low level 
of schooling, made it impossible for the country’s citizens to control the working of the country’s 
local administrators. Hence the need to entrust surveillance of the workings of municipalities and 
provinces to central government bodies, or to establish constraints on tax rates. Secondly, there was 
the belief that an efficient public administration, and thus a solid bureaucratic apparatus for the 
surveillance of local authorities by the central state, was a prerequisite for economic growth29. 
Hence the “obsession” of the governing classes, following Unification, with standardising the 
administrative system and rationalising those structures that had been put in place in previous 
centuries30. 
However, this is the very point on which the political plans of the historical right-wing forces 
governing Italy during the initial post-Unification period floundered. The right-wing opposed the 
introduction of as federal-type or regionalist model, since it did not believe in the southern 
governing classes, and because it deemed such a model unsuitable within the context of such strong 
regional differences. While it standardised bureaucratic rules and apparatuses in order to render 
Italy more homogeneous, at the same time it decentralised municipal revenue in order that the 
country’s local authorities assume responsibility for their expenditure. However, it failed to 
understand the importance of combining fiscal decentralisation with equalisation mechanisms in 
order to avoid any further impoverishment of the nation’s less developed areas.  
In fact, Italy’s municipalities and provinces were assigned important functions in the fields of 
primary and technical education31 and of services to the weaker sections of the population. It was 
clear that this decentralisation of tax revenue would mean high levels of spending in the wealthier 
areas, and much lower levels of investment in the poorer areas. Furthermore, it also stimulated the 
efforts of those municipalities that had been used to a  certain degree of autonomy, such as those 
situated in Lombardy-Veneto and Tuscany, whereas it encouraged a certain passiveness in areas 
                                                 
28
  See Ruffilli ???  on this point. As far as regards the analysis of local administration within the pre-Unification 
states, see Toth  ???; Tonetti 1987; Pansini 1956; Casini 1953-54; Lodolini 1959; Rotelli 1979. 
29
  See V. Zamagni 1996.  
30
  Ruffilli ???? 
31
 Zamagni 1997 
that had traditionally been used to depending more on the central state, such as the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies32 . 
However, there appears to have been little awareness of this fact. This is highlighted by the 
bill for the reform of municipal and provincial administrations, presented in 1852 by the then 
Minister of the Interior for the Kingdom of Savoy, Gustavo Ponza di San Martino. One of the 
articles in this bill most heavily criticised by the Council of State was the one concerning the setting 
up of a permanent common fund to be shared out according to the Provinces’ needs, and to be 
augmented by an additional tax on the provincial surcharge. The unacceptable aspect of this plan, 
according to the principles of the Piedmontese Council of State, was that it failed to observe a basic 
principle of Piedmontese law, according to which “each province is bound to finance solely its own 
works or those works which in some way are beneficial to it”33, whereas the common fund meant 
that the richer provinces were to finance part of the works of the poorer provinces. San Martino’s 
awareness of the fact that in order to rebalance the level of infrastructures in place in the various 
regions of Italy, equalising instruments needed to be included in the local authority system, was 
never taken any further. Minghetti himself, when presenting his project for Italy’s regions, 
remarked that the said task could only be carried out through the discretionary intervention of the 
central state. “Just as there are some provinces in which available wealth falls substantially short of 
existing needs and of those difficulties to be overcome, and in such cases the region or the state may 
supply such needs, there are also regions which by nature or inclination, or as a result of the ill-will 
of past governments or of adverse fortunes, find themselves still lacking in those structures, those 
roads, those waterworks that elsewhere have been organised and completed for some time. Reason 
tells us that this is why the nation needs to come to their assistance …”34. 
Not even the continued existence of the aforesaid geographical imbalances managed to dent 
politicians’ faith in this solution; indeed, at the end of the 1880s, when it became clear that different 
measures were needed for different regions, Italy’s government and parliament chose first to 
introduce special laws, and then to set up special bodies; in other words, they opted for instruments 
which are, by definition, temporary. Giolitti’s era was characterised by a constant series of 
commissions, advisory and technical bodies, designed to facilitate the institutional link between the 
prefect and the various local forces35.  Historians have interpreted this turnaround as the 
abandonment of the pursuit of uniformity that had characterised the first forty years of the newly-
unified Italian state. Perhaps it would be more accurate to see it as the acknowledgement of the 
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failure of an administrative system that was completely decentralised in terms of revenue. At this 
point, there were only two options left: the introduction of automatic equalising instruments that 
would increase the financial resources of the poorer areas of Italy, or direct state intervention. The 
setting up of government commissions clearly went in the latter direction which, in the absence of 
any reform of local finances, was really the only remaining option. 
We would like to make one further observation regarding the much-debated question of 
regional differences or gaps. Disparities in public spending (including both local and central 
spending) between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the other regions of Italy, appear so great 
that they cannot be explained solely in terms of different fiscal policies. Were this the case, lower 
public spending would have been accompanied by a higher level of private consumption or 
investment, which no study has in fact observed as yet.      
Tables 
 
Table 1 Per-capita  municipal revenue and spending in the Italian peninsula before Unification and 
index of fiscal decentralisation (ratio of municipal revenue to total – municipal and statal- revenue), 
1858, lire. 
 Municipal 
revenue 
Municipal 
spending 
State revenue Index of fiscal 
decentralisation  
Kingdom of Savoy 6,8 9,4 26,3 20% 
Piedmont 7,5 10,1 
  
Liguria 8,2 9,9 
  
Sardinia 3,3 5,8 
  
Lombardy- Veneto 16,9 16,9 27 38% 
Lombardy 16,9 17,3 
  
Veneto 16,8 16,4 
  
Duchy of Parma and Duchy of Modena 
(and some Papal state’s provinces) 
    
  
Emilia 7,4 7,4 
  
Papal state * 6,6 6,4 24 22% 
Umbria 6,1 5,8 
  
Marches 6,9 6,7 
  
Grand Duchy of Tuscany 11 11 19,1 37% 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 5,5 5,5 17,2 24% 
Abruzzi e Molise 3,4 3,4 
  
Campania 4,2 4,2 
  
Puglie 3,5 3,5 
  
Basilicata 3,3 3,3 
  
Calabrie 2,7 2,7 
  
Sicily 11 11 
  
Sources: Our elaborations of data from Statistica del Regno d’Italia, Amministrazione pubblica, bilanci comunali del 
1866 e bilanci provinciali del 1866-68, Firenze, 1868;  Felisini , Le finanze pontificie e i Rothschild 1830-1870,  Napoli, 
1990. 
  
 Table 2. Per capita municipal and central government excise duties on consumer godds, 1861, lire  
 Central state 
revenue before 
Unification 
Central state 
revenue in 
1861 
Municipal 
revenue in 
1861 
Ratio of  municipal 
revenue to total 
revenue in  1861  
% 
Provinces of Piedmont 
and Liguria 
1,30 1,44 1,97 58% 
Provinces of Lombardy 
(Mantova excluded) 
2,97 2,58 0,61 19% 
Provinces of the former 
Duchy of PArma 
0,85 0,36 2,45 87% 
Provinces of the former 
Duchy of Modena 
0,83 0,88 0,20 18% 
Provinces of Romagna 2,86 2,29 0,87 28% 
Marches 2,58 0,51 1,69 77% 
Umbria 3,05 0,00 0,81 100% 
Tuscany 2,46 0,00 2,88 100% 
Naples city 1,05 0,05 1,12 96% 
Sicily 6,75 0,00 2,23 100% 
 
Notes: The duties revenue for Marches, Umbria and  Sicily includes the corn tax. 
Sources: Our elaboration of data from Parravicini 1958 
 
Table 3  Per capita municipal revenue and expenditure, lire, 1860 
Provinces of  Total 
expendi
ture 
Total 
revenue 
Tax revenue Tax revenue 
(excise duties 
on consumer 
goods  
excluded) 
Excise  
duties on 
consumer 
goods  
Ratio of 
duties 
revenue to 
tax revenue 
% 
Ratio of  
land over-
taxes  to 
tax 
revenue % 
 Piedmont 
and Liguria 
10,3 9,8 5,8 3,6 2,2 38% 49% 
Sardinia 6,6 6,4 3,2 2,6 0,6 20% 74% 
Modena 6,2 6,2 4,0 3,1 0,8 21% 75% 
Lombardy 9,8 9,7 5,3 4,7 0,6 12% 82% 
Parma 7,6 7,7 5,9 4,6 1,3 22% 75% 
Romagna 9,3 10,3 8,8 6,9 1,9 22% 54% 
Tuscany 8,5 11,4 6,3 4,0 2,3 36% 61% 
Marches 4,9 5,4 4,9 3,2 1,7 34% 28% 
Umbria 3,6 3,4 2,8 2,0 0,8 29% 28% 
Naples 3,6 3,1 1,5 0,4 1,1 76% 11% 
Sicily 5,2 4,0 2,4 0,05 2,3 98% 0% 
Source : Our elaborations of data from Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, Progetto Minghetti, 
cit. 
 Table 4 Consequences of the Rattazzi decree and of the 1865 law on the decentralisation level 
(measured by ratio of municipal to total tax revenue). 
Regions and former states    1858 1863 1868 
Piedmont  42% 35% 
Liguria  46% 56% 
Sardinia  28% 32% 
Kingdom of Savoy 20% 41% 38% 
Lombardy  49% 37% 
Veneto   34% 
Lombardy-Veneto 38%  36% 
Emilia (Parma e Modena) ----- 45% 33% 
 
   
Umbria  34% 32% 
Marches  38% 32% 
Papal state 22% 37% 32% 
Tuscany 37% 36% 47% 
 
   
Abruzzi e molise  14% 16% 
Campania  21% 35% 
Puglie  18% 26% 
Basilicata  14% 16% 
Calabrie  11% 15% 
Kingdom of Naples  17% 25% 
Sicily  27% 31% 
Kingdom of the two Sicilies 24%   
National average  33% 33% 
Sources: Our elaborations of data from  Statistica del Regno d’Italia, Amministrazione pubblica, 
bilanci comunali del 1866 e bilanci provinciali del 1866-68, Firenze, 1868. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Per capita municipal and provincial tax revenue  in 1863 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: our elaborations of data from  Ministero dell’agricoltura , dell’industria e del commercio, Statistica del Regno 
d’Italia, bilanci comunali e provinciali, anno 1863, Firenze 1865, and Bilanci comunali 1884, Roma.  
 
Fig. 2 Per capita municipal and provincial tax revenue  in  1899 
 
Sources: our elaborations of data from  Ministero dell’agricoltura , dell’industria e del commercio, Statistica del Regno 
d’Italia, bilanci comunali e provinciali, anno 1863, Firenze 1865, and Bilanci comunali 1884, Roma.  
 
Table 5. Per capita municipal revenue,  years 1863-1999, at constant prices (1890). 
Provinces of the 
former   Italian 
states 
1863 1865 1868 1884 1891 1895 1899 Rate of growth 
1863-1899 
Pr. Napoletane 4,6 9,6 8,4 10,3 10 10 12,7 176% 
Pr. Sicily 7,4 10,3 9,8 11,2 10,1 10,4 11,4 54% 
Regno .2 Sicilie 5,5 9,8 8,8 10,6 10,1 10,2 12,3 124% 
Lombardy 14,5 23,9 13,0 12,2 12,3 11,2 14,4 0% 
Duchy of Modena 7,7 11,4 8,0 9,2 10,1 9,9 11,2 45% 
Duchy of Parma 9,3 13,0 10,1 11,1 11,7 12,3 13,2 42% 
Papal state    15,2 17,4 17,5 18,5  
Roma excluded 11,0 13,7 10,2 12,2 12,8 12,5 13,8 25% 
Kingdom of 
Savoy 
11,3 14,8 12,5 12,8 13,2 13,3 15,3 35% 
Toscana 10,3 14,3 14,5 14,7 14,9 14,0 16,7 62% 
Veneto ---- ---- 8,6 11,6 10,5 11,4 12,8 *49% 
 
        
National average 9,2 13,8 10,6 12,2 12,2 12,3 14,1 53% 
*years 1868-1899 for Veneto. 
Sources: our elaborations of data from Annuario statistico italiano, years  
1861,1871,1884,1892,1896,1898; from Maic, Bilanci comunali, years 1863, 1868, 1884, 
1891,1895, 1899 and from  Annuario del Ministero delle finanze, 1867. 
 Table 6. Per capita municipal revenue, 1863-1899, at constant prices (1890). 
Regions 1863 1884 1899 Rate of growth 1863-1899 
Piedmont e Liguria 11,9 13,2 16,0 42% 
Lombardy 14,5 12,1 14,2 5% 
Veneto ----- 11,7 12,8  
Emilia 12,6 13,0 14,1 9% 
Marches 10,7 11,9 14,5 35% 
Tuscany e Umbria 9,8 13,7 15,7 51% 
Roma  25,9 34,1  
Abruzzi e Molise 3,8 6,8 8,7 124% 
Campania 5,8 13,0 15,4 138% 
Naples excluded 4,2 7,9 9,4 117% 
Apulia e Basilicata 4,7 9,8 11,2 136% 
Calabria 3,1 7,1 8,4 171% 
Isole 7,5 11,1 10,9 32% 
Sources: see table 5 
 
Table 7 Ratio of land over-tax to municipal revenue 
Former Italian states 1863 1865 1868 1884 1891 1895 1899 
Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies 
8% 21% 16% 24% 22% 26% 24% 
(senza Napoli) 10%  17% 25% 22% 28% 25% 
Lombardy 42% 36% 48% 48% 44% 51% 41% 
Duchy of Modena 56% 59% 60% 46% 40% 42% 40% 
Duchy of Parma 59% 70% 56% 55% 51% 50% 49% 
Papal state     29% 31% 30% 
(Roma excluded) 46% 60% 45% 41% 36% 39% 36% 
Kingdom of Savoy 41% 43% 33% 33% 28% 31% 27% 
(Torino excluded) 46%  40% 35% 29% 34% 29% 
Tuscany 40% 37% 36% 41% 38% 42% 39% 
(Firenze excluded) 34%  43% 43% 40% 44% 41% 
Veneto   74% 55% 50% 51% 46% 
Sources: see table 5 
 Table 8 Per capita municipal excise duties on consumer goods (or indirect taxes for the years 1861-
1865) and municipal land over-tax, at  constant prices (1890).  
Former 
Italian 
states. 
1861 
indirect 
taxes 
1861 
land 
over-
taxes. 
1865 
tindirect 
axes 
1865 
land 
over-
taxes. 
1868 
duties 
1868  
land 
over-
taxes 
1884 
duties 
1884  
land 
over-
taxes 
1891 
duties 
1891  
land 
over-
taxes 
1895 
duties 
1895  
land 
over-
taxes 
1899 
duties 
1899  
land 
over-
taxes 
Kingdom 
of the Two 
Sicilies 
2,3 0,1 5,4 2,1 5,1 1,4 4,5 2,6 4,8 2,2 5,4 2,7 5,6 2,9 
Naples 
excluded 
2,4 0,1 3,9 2,1 3,7 1,3 3,4 2,3 3,8 2,0 4,2 2,4 4,2 2,6 
Lombardy 0,9 5,5 6,8 8,6 4,1 6,2 3,1 5,9 3,4 5,5 3,7 5,7 4,0 5,9 
Duchy of 
Mod. 
0,5 3,4 2,5 6,8 0,9 4,8 1,5 4,3 2,1 4,1 2,6 4,2 2,6 4,5 
Duchy of 
Parma 
1,6 4,8 1,5 9,0 3,1 5,6 3,0 6,1 3,3 5,9 3,8 6,2 4,1 6,5 
Papal 
state 
      4,6 5,2 6,1 5,1 6,4 5,5 6,4 5,5 
Roma 
excluded 
3,4 3,2 4,0 8,2 3,0 4,6 2,4 5,0 3,0 4,6 3,2 4,9 3,3 5,0 
Kingdom 
of Savoy 
3,0 3,0 5,1 6,3 5,3 4,2 4,5 4,2 5,5 3,7 6,0 4,1 6,5 4,2 
Torino 
excluded 
2,7 3,2 4,2 6,3 4,8 6,4 4,0 4,4 5,1 3,7 5,6 4,2 6,1 4,3 
Grand 
Duchy of 
Tuscany 
0,2 4,3 7,2 5,3 7,2 5,3 4,9 6,0 5,4 5,7 5,5 6,2 5,7 6,5 
Firenze 
excluded 
0,2 4,5 7,6 4,9 5,2 5,3 4,1 6,0 4,6 5,6 4,4 5,9 4,7 6,2 
Veneto     0,5 6,4 2,3 6,4 2,6 5,2 3,0 5,8 3,5 5,9 
Sources: see table 5 
 
 
  
Table 9 Municipalities exceeding legal restriction on land over-tax rates, (%). 
Stati 
preunitari 
1884, % 
of 
exceedi
ng 
municip
alities 
1884, % 
of 
municip
alities 
exceedi
ng for  
200 
cent. 
1884, 
ratio of 
municip
al land 
over-tax 
to 
central 
state 
land tax 
1891, 
ratio of 
municipal 
and 
provincia
l land  
over-tax 
to central 
state land 
tax 
1895, 
% of 
exceed
ing 
munici
palitie
s 
1895, 
ratio of 
municip
al and 
provinci
al land  
over-tax 
to 
central 
state 
land tax 
1899, % 
of 
exceedi
ng 
municip
alities 
1899, 
ratio of 
municipa
l and 
provincia
l land  
over-tax 
to central 
state land 
tax 
Kingdom of 
the Two 
Sicilies 
46% 1% 0,87 0,94 40% 0,96 47% 0,98 
Lombardy 72% 13% 0,96 1,04 82% 1,03 84% 1,04 
Duchy of 
Modena 
74% 6% 0,96 1,17 73% 1,17 74% 1,25 
Duchy of 
Parma 
51% 8% 1,27 1,40 92% 1,42 94% 1,42 
Papal state 64% 14% 1,11 1,14 64% 1,14 66% 1,19 
Kingdom of 
Savoy 
65% 19% 0,99 0,99 60% 1,03 61% 1,04 
Tuscany 92% 13% 1,36 1,36 96% 1,42 97% 1,47 
Veneto 91% 16% 1,36 1,47 93% 1,51 92% 1,50 
Source: see table 5 
 
Table 10 Per capita land tax and land over-tax in 1884 and  1899, constant prices (1890) 
Former 
Italian 
states 
1884 
Municip
al land 
over-tax 
1884, 
Provicial 
land 
over-tax 
1884, 
Central 
state 
land tax 
1884, 
Total 
1899, 
Municip
al land 
over-tax 
1899, 
Provicial 
land 
over-tax 
1899, 
Provicial 
land 
over-tax 
1899, 
Total 
Kingdom 
of the Two 
Sicilies 
2,6 3,0 6,4 12,0 2,9 2,8 5,8 11,4 
Lombardy 5,9 2,7 8,8 17,4 5,9 2,4 8,0 16,3 
Duchy of 
Modena 
4,3 2,7 7,2 14,1 4,5 3,7 6,6 14,8 
Duchy of 
Parma 
6,1 4,2 8,1 18,3 6,5 4,1 7,5 18,1 
Papal 
state 
5,2 3,2 7,6 16,0 5,5 3,4 7,5 16,5 
Kingdom 
of Savoy 
4,5 2,8 7,5 14,9 4,2 2,9 6,9 14,0 
Tuscany 6,0 2,7 6,5 15,2 6,5 3,0 6,4 15,9 
Veneto 6,4 2,5 6,6 15,5 5,9 2,7 5,7 14,4 
Source: see table 5 
 
 
Fig. 3 Per capita municipal land over-tax in 1861. 
  
 
 
Fig. 4 Per capita municipal land over-tax in 1899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figura 5.A  Average tariffs applied in 1895 by the 49 municipalities with a population of between 
20.000 and 50.000. 
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Figura 5.B  Average tariffs applied in 1895 by the 14 large municipalities (those with over 50.000 inhabitans) 
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Source:  our elaborations of data from Maic, Dirstat, Bilanci comunali e tariffe daziarie dei comuni 
chiusi, 1895. 
Notes. 
1. Customs duties are on the following goods: Flour (2 dfferent kind), bread, pasta,  butter, ice,  
chicken, eggs, cheese (3 different kind), milk, coffee and similar (3 different kind), fresh 
fish (3 different kind) dry beans, coal, candle, soap, salt.  
  
Table 11 Government subsidies on education and public works  
Years Municipalities 
(000  lire) 
Provinces 
(000 lire) 
Municipalities  
(% of total 
revenue) 
Provinces 
(% of total 
revenue) 
1869 1635 - 1% - 
1870 1618 - 1% - 
1871 1107 - 1% - 
1872 1374 - 1% - 
1873 3526 486 2% 1% 
1874 2167 446 1% 1% 
1875 4122 435 2% 1% 
1876 7764 709 3% 1% 
1877 6861 - 3% - 
1878 6836 - 2% - 
1879 7081 - 2% - 
1880 7482 - 3% - 
1881 7516 - 3% - 
1882 9916 980 3% 1% 
1883 8975 1061 3% 1% 
1884 10288 1479 3% 2% 
1885 9329 2688 3% 3% 
1886 9191 1322 3% 1% 
1887 9049 - 3% - 
1888 6487 - 2% - 
1889 9913 2044 3% 2% 
1890 - 3234 - 3% 
1891 10092 2276 3% 2% 
1895 9917 - 2% - 
1899 6723 - 2% - 
 
Source:  our elaborations of data from  Statistica dei bilanci comunali e provinciali, several years. 
 
 
Table 12 Regression on government subsidies granted to Municipalities and Provinces 
Dependent variable const Mun-
expediture 
Mun-revenue Population R2 F 
Gov-subsidy 1873 -0,8 (-1,93) 0.139 (1,76) 0,11 (3,38) -0.002 (-3.04) 0,44 16,8 
Gov-subsidy 1873 -0.15 (-1.78)  0,15 (6,5) -0.002 (-2.87) 0,39  
Gov-subsidy 1884 -0,001 (-0.007) 0.07 (2,34) -0,0005 (-0.09) -0.00014 (-0.72) 0.08 2 
Gov-subsidy 1899 -0.11 (-0.99) -0.043 (-1.43) 0.03 (3.71)  0.19 6 
Gov-subsidy 1899 -0.17 (1.9)  0.03 (4.0)  0.18 16 
Legenda: 
Gov-subsidy = percacapita  government subsidies 
Mun-expediture = per capita muncipal expenditure on education and public woks (goverment subsidy excluded) 
Mun-revenue = per capita municipal revenue (goverment subsidy excluded) 
const = constant 
pop = population 
T test in bracket  
 
Table 13 Percentage of residual debt owed to the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti  (the Deposits and Loans 
Fund) against total municipal debts and per-capita debt due to the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti at 
constant prices (1890) 
 1877 ddll 1877 per 
capita debts, 
lire 
1884% ddll 1884 per 
capita debts 
1900 per 
capita debts 
1900% ddll 
Piedmont 5% 0,6 14% 2,4 4,9 22% 
Liguria 1% 0,8 4% 3,1 24,0 21% 
Lombard
y 
4% 1,1 4% 1,2 2,0 5% 
Veneto 2% 0,2 9% 1,1 3,1 22% 
Emilia 8% 0,9 18% 2,4 6,4 29% 
Tuscany  1% 1,4 20% 42,7 20,5 40% 
Marches 28% 3,8 44% 3,9 19,9 73% 
Umbria 0% 0,0 40% 4,6 20,0 73% 
Lazio 0% 0,0 39% 32,4 68,1 28% 
Abruzzo 8% 0,3 59% 3,0 11,7 63% 
Campania 4% 1,5 28% 33,4 26,8 33% 
Apulia  5% 0,7 18% 7,8 10,2 47% 
Basilicata 24% 0,8 57% 5,0 9,4 64% 
Calabria 0% 0,0 51% 5,6 8,2 66% 
Sicily* 27% 2,6 24% 3,7 11,7 56% 
Sardinia 39% 3,5 34% 7,8 26,0 97% 
Source:  our elaborations of data from  Maic, dirstat,  Debiti comunali e provinciali, anni vari. 
Notes: For the year 1900 the municipal loans include borrowing from the Sezione di credito 
comunale e provinciale and from Cassa di soccorso per le opere pubbliche. 
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